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ABstrAct – The category “organism” has an ambiguous status: is it scientific or is it 
philosophical? Or, if one looks at it from within the relatively recent field or sub-field of 
philosophy of biology, is it a central, or at least legitimate category therein, or should it 
be dispensed with? In any case, it has long served as a kind of scientific bolstering for 
a philosophical train of argument which seeks to refute the mechanistic or reductionist 
trend, which has been perceived as dominant since the 17th century, whether in the case of 
Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch, or, lastly, of the 
“phenomenology of organic life” in the 20th century, with authors such as Kurt Goldstein, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georges Canguilhem. In this paper I try to reconstruct some 
of the main interpretive stages or layers of the concept of organism in order to evaluate it 
critically. How might organism be a useful concept if one rules out the excesses of organismic 
biology and metaphysics? Varieties of instrumentalism and what I call the projective concept 
of organism are appealing, but perhaps ultimately unsatisfying.
keywords – Organism, organization, holism, mechanism, reductionism, Kant, Goldstein, 
Varela
I
What is an organism? There have been a variety of answers to this 
question, not just in the sense of different definitions (an organism is a 
biological individual; it is a living being; it is a self-organizing, metabolic 
system; etc.) but more tendentiously, in the sense that philosophers, sci-
entists, natural philosophers, and others have both asserted and denied 
the existence of organisms. And of course, the existence or better, the 
reality of organisms is intimately bound up with a host of other weighty 
matters, such as the emergence of biology as an autonomous discipline 
and its subsequent efforts to maintain that autonomy; how to account 
for the animate dimension of animate beings, in the absence of a con-
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cept of immortal soul and more recent debates both internal to biology 
and spanning fields such as the philosophy of biology, such as the status 
of genes, populations, ecosystems, and so on. To inquire into the onto-
logical status of organisms, in such a tense and overdetermined field of 
theories, polemics, and associations is somehow already to seem to take 
a stand, much like those professional skeptics who never seem to be able 
to shake off their life-long obsession with the paranormal. That is, if we 
seek to dispel some of the confusion and categorize some of the differ-
ent positions on the issue, we are already granting that there could be an 
ontological status of organisms and that the question makes sense.
Disciplinary boundaries are not easy to employ here, because in one 
generation thinkers used organism as a term directly derived from nat-
ural philosophy with the (empirical, experimental) authority that this 
grants; in another generation it has become something fully conceptual 
or even ideological, as when Hans Jonas, opposing the world of con-
scious organisms to the dead world of mechanical nature, insists that 
“the point of life itself” lies in “its being self-centered individuality.” 
Jonas calls this “the ontological concept of an individual, as against a 
merely phenomenological one” (Jonas 1966, 79). Here we are being told 
not just that organisms exist and we should not deprive them of their 
reality in favor of molecules, genes, or populations. We are being told 
that such deprivation is wrong, almost morally wrong, which is not so 
surprising if we consider that historically, the case can be made that or-
ganism is initially a naturalistic substitute for soul (in the Leibniz-Stahl 
debate of the late 17th and early 18th century). “The history of the con-
cept of organism in the 18th century can be summed up as the search, by 
naturalists, physicians and philosophers, for replacements or semantic 
equivalents for the soul, which could account for the increasingly well-
established fact of the functional unity of a system of integrated parts” 
(Canguilhem 1989, 551).
Organism is a hybrid concept, located from the outset between dif-
ferent kinds of practices, constantly shifting in between the factual and 
what one might call the supra-factual. Organisms can thus be metaphysi-
cal, empirical-but-used-for-metaphysical-purposes, ideological, or re-
strictively biological concepts. They can be particular states of matter, or 
particular types of living beings chosen as experimental objects, like the 
fruit fly or C. elegans, which are model organisms. Worse still, at least for 
the sake of finding a manageable ontological box in which to fit them, 
on some definitions “humongous fungi” weighing ten tons, coral reefs, 
living and breathing termite mounds, or forests qualify as organisms 
(Turner 2000; Wilson 2007; Bouchard 2009). So even a study limiting 
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itself to the rhetoric of science would be very large.1 It is not surprising 
that a short but insightful study of its history in modern biology called 
the organism “biology’s phoenix” (Benson 1989).
To sort out the disappearances and returns of this hybrid, “phoenix” 
concept, even in part, requires a combination of historical and critical 
analysis. The latter is not exactly identical with the type of analysis prac-
ticed by mainstream philosophy of biology, in which the task for the 
philosopher is indeed a kind of specialized conceptual analysis aiming 
at clarifying the implications and perhaps consequences of biological 
claims. So, for instance, a recent and influential definition of the dis-
cipline explains that it is “concerned with those biological debates in 
which conceptual and empirical issues are so entangled that progress de-
mands both scientific knowledge and the tools of philosophical analysis” 
(Stotz, Griffiths and Knight 2004, 647). I concur with this definition, but 
wish in addition to locate something about the concept of organism and 
to critique it. In that sense I take quite seriously the moral that “biology’s 
exciting conclusions do not follow from the facts alone” (Sterelny and 
Griffiths 1999, 5). 
The interpretive, conceptual, clarifying, and evaluative task at hand is 
not then just a matter of drawing subjective philosophical conclusions 
from an objective scientific set of facts. It involves making (and again, 
evaluating) ontological claims about the nature of biological entities, 
which have an irreducibly normative component (in the sense that their 
activity is interrelated with the norms of such activity). There is a role 
for the philosopher in discerning what gets to count as “real patterns,” 
in Dennett’s suggestive phrase (Dennett 1991). But for various reasons, 
not least the ever-shifting definitions provided by working biologists 
(embryological, genetic, molecular, ecological, and now systemic), philo-
sophical reflection may benefit in addition from some historical consid-
erations – rather than trying to adjudicate between various aprioristic 
claims and/or scientific definitions. After all, as Manfred Laubichler 
noted in a review essay with the endearing title, “The Organism is dead. 
Long live the organism!” (Laubichler 2000), there have been many his-
tories of the gene and few, if any, histories of the organism (with the 
above-mentioned exception of Benson 1989, which is intended more as 
a programmatic statement).
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the emergence of 
the term and its episodic history including in the 20th century, in order 
to specify the problem further of what sort of object we are addressing, 
1 See however Schlanger 1971; Schiller 1978 – which is in fact a polemic against the concept of 
organism despite its historical pretentions – and especially Cheung 2006 and 2010.
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which sort of discourse is meant to be authoritative (who owns it), and 
so on. In section 3, I describe some of the polarizations that have arisen 
and suggest some basic criteria a theory of organism needs to abide by 
if it is to be viable. In section 4, I turn to the varieties of mechanistic 
approaches to organism, including the complexified and organizational 
approach we owe to Claude Bernard, in contradistinction to the concep-
tion of organism as a kind of paramount subjectivity. In section 5, I in-
troduce the distinction between Kant’s regulative approach to organism 
(which, I argue, can be extended through the work of Kurt Goldstein 
and Daniel Dennett) and the post-Kantian ontologization thereof. I ex-
tend this discussion in section 6 and introduce the distinction between 
methodological and ontological views of organism, but quickly point 
out the insufficiency of such distinctions. In section 7, I discuss various 
conceptions of the unity which is meant to characterize organisms and 
conclude, in section 8, with some critical reflections on holism and the 
theory of systems. Overall I argue for some combination of the projec-
tive view of organisms (Goldstein et al.) and the organizational view, 
recently restated by William Bechtel.
II
If we look at the historical context, the word “organism” emerges 
in the late 17th-early 18th centuries, in particular in the debate between 
Leibniz and the chemist and physician Georg-Ernest Stahl (the author 
in 1708 of a treatise entitled On the difference between mechanism and 
organism), who was the chief representative of the animist position, ac-
cording to which all animate motions are explainable in terms of the soul 
(Duchesneau 1998, 335 sq.; Duchesneau 2000). After this one does not 
find the term much used in our sense, in which it is opposed to machine, 
until the late 18th century. In Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie 
there are almost no occurrences of the term organism; one finds the ad-
jective organic, dating back at least to the 14th century. And in several of 
its occurrences, organism (organisme) clearly does not yet have the sense 
we associate with it. The article Fibre speaks of “the organism or mecha-
nism of these various parts” (Diderot and D’Alembert, 1751-1780, VI, 
670) and the vitalist physician Bordeu, in a late work, the Recherches sur 
les maladies chroniques of 1775, speaks in a way we would find strange 
or confusing today, of the “organism of the living body” (Bordeu 1818, 
vol. 2, 1024). 
The technical term in the Enlightenment for physiological structure 
was rather organisation, defined in the Encyclopédie as “arrangement des 
parties qui constituent les corps animés” (Diderot and D’Alembert, 
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1751-1780, IX, 629b). It is comparable and related to terms such as or-
ganized bodies and animal economy, the latter designating both a kind of 
theoretical approach in medicine and physiology to the living body and 
that body itself.2 Even a work filled with teleology and purposiveness 
like Kant’s Third Critique does not contain the term organism; it only 
appears in his Opus postumum (see Debru 1980; Huneman 2007; 2010). 
Kant speaks instead of “organized bodies.” Notice, and this illustrates 
the hybridity of the concept, that the notion is located from the outset at 
the intersection of philosophical inquiry into the status of living beings 
(Leibniz, Kant) and properly biological reflection. The existence in ad-
dition of a variety of natural-philosophical works in this period, dealing 
with such topics, by authors such as Francis Glisson, Walter Charleton, 
Robert Boyle, or Claude Perrault (Wolfe 2010a), does not alter the fact 
of this hybridity.
Aside from the classical authors mentioned above, philosophers in the 
20th century have had a certain interest in the concept of organism, es-
pecially phenomenologically motivated authors such as Kurt Goldstein, 
Hans Jonas, and on the other side of the Rhine, Henri Bergson, Gilbert 
Simondon, and Raymond Ruyer. All these figures argue for such a con-
cept, although in different ways, as I shall discuss below (some, like Gold-
stein articulate a projective view of organism as a construct with benefits, 
so to speak, while others follow a line consonant with strong vitalism, 
in which the organism appears, not just ontologically specific but almost 
transcendent with regard to the rest of the natural world).3 And there was 
of course a significant group of biologists in England in the early decades 
of the century who were equally concerned with organism and holism 
(Haldane et al. 1918), as well as geneticists who were, curiously enough, 
followers of Whitehead, including W.E. Agar, who late in his career wrote 
an entire treatise on organism (Agar 1943). It is worth noting that con-
trary to what one reads often, including in the brief historical references in 
most contemporary philosophy of biology (including Gilbert and Sarkar 
2000), holism was never intended by any of its early 20th-century found-
ers such as Jan Smuts (Smuts 1926) to be synonymous with organicism or 
2 On “organisation” and “organism” see Balan 1975; Figlio 1976; Guillo 2003; Wolfe 2004; Wolfe 
2009; Cheung 2010; on the notion of the animal economy in vitalist medicine see Wolfe and Terada 
2008.
3 Ruyer, who in other respects was a significant philosopher, reads like the worst parts of Driesch 
when dealing with biological matters. He warns the reader that because of contemporary science we 
must choose between “a generalized ‘theory of organism’ and the theory of a ‘generalized molecule’” 
(Ruyer 1952, 166). Indeed, he regrets that molecular explanations do away with Drieschian entelechies 
by reducing embryo development to physicochemical laws (Ruyer 1946, 80). Even Bergson is too 
mechanistic and Cartesian for Ruyer, in the sense that he had an excessively spatial understanding of 
the body (Ruyer 1946, 30)!
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vitalism, for the simple reason that it seeks to find general organizational 
laws, inspired by physics, without insisting on the uniqueness of life; it is 
the thesis of “global dependence.”4 But of course holism could be used to 
articulate organismic theory and it was. The theoretical point that emerges 
from this early 20th-century historical context is that there are two distinct 
areas of tension: first, an older but enduring tension between mechanism 
and organism, in which each of these allows of different degrees of inter-
pretation and, second, a 20th-century tension between mechanists (reduc-
tionists) and holists. Again, the two can sometimes coincide and form a 
battery of arguments in favour of organicism.
We are familiar with the story of the eclipse of organism concepts in 
twentieth-century biology, which has multiple possible causes, ranging 
from the rise of genetics (from Watson and Crick in 1953 to the Hu-
man Genome Project) to the emergence of evolutionary biology in its 
own right. At first the latter may seem like a more receptive environ-
ment for organism concepts, as has been argued in recent decades by 
various strands of developmentalist theories, but in a very basic sense 
evolutionary biology tends to combine a supra-organismal level such as 
populations with a sub-organismal level (genes); the organism no longer 
has much explanatory force here (Walsh 2010). In addition, faced with 
the molecularization of biological entities, it is not just that the organism 
might seem old-fashioned or in need of deflationary treatment. It seems 
to proclaim by its very name that it transcends the mechanistic, causal 
world, or equally problematic, that it introduces other forms of causal-
ity, such as circular, top-down, or non-linear. This is partly captured in 
Haldane’s quip which makes it sound like the harmless word organism is 
in fact the mysterious technical term “norganism”: “but it’s a norganism, 
my dear young fellow, a norganism !” (Haldane, in: Huxley 1971, 138). 
Now, “both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for 
granted . . . . Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that” (Hull 
1981, 282). “Organisms have disappeared as the fundamental units of 
life. In their place we now have genes …” (Goodwin 1994, 1).
4 So, e.g. Köhler’s Gestalt psychology is a form of holism, in which he tries to model psychological 
theory on the field theory of Faraday and Maxwell. Of course, there are also contradictory moments 
such as when the founder of systems biology, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, invokes holism as a total sys-
temic standpoint (again, with no reference to any special status of living entities), but earlier says that 
it sheds particular light on embryology and how organisms are not mere machines (he refers both to 
their teleology and their “historical character,” a phrase we also find in Goldstein [von Bertalanffy 
1933, 9, 33, 52]). He wrote further essays on organismic theory later in life. In other papers from the 
early years of systems theory there is also the recognition that the boundaries of a system are subjective. 
Hence, the boundary between the living and the non-living is not the issue.
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At the very least, “the ‘organism’ turns out to be a highly contest-
able notion” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 173). Yet, organisms are also 
paradigm cases of individuals and of purposive entities, without either 
of these notions having to rest on a particular restrictive definition of 
life versus non-life. The challenge for the philosopher is not just to pick 
out features of these entities (or conversely, reject the entire idea) but to 
navigate in between the Charybdis of self-contented molecular reduc-
tionism and the Scylla of knee-jerk, biophilosophical anti-reductionism. 
To inquire conceptually into the ontological status of organisms in this 
sense includes, as I indicated above, a critical and evaluative assessment 
of the overdeterminations, vocabulary shifts, and ideological commit-
ments inherent in the notion. The goal is not to locate a definition of 
organism, whether in strict descriptive terms, e.g., as a “self-maintaining, 
autonomous and physically bounded entity” (Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria 
et al. 2000, 222), or in more metaphysical terms as “the only type of 
individual” that combines “functional and self-reproductive identity” at 
once (Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. 2000, 229); for definitions run the 
risk of reverting to the form of assertions such as “the organism is es-
sentially self-consciousness” or “the organism is in its essence temporal 
rather than merely spatial.” Instead, I discuss attempts to describe the 
category of organism in less definitional terms, either as forms of organi-
zation or as forms of projection.
III
Is it possible to evaluate the value or the legitimacy of the concept of 
organism? Yes, inasmuch as it expresses a polarization between two vi-
sions of what living beings are, which implies, in turn, two visions of hu-
man being; that is, two visions of the place of human beings in the natural 
world and, by that token, two ideological attitudes towards science. In 
that sense there are not two different sets of concepts, one philosophical, 
and one scientific. Whenever the term is used in any sense beyond the 
completely neutral one, e.g. saying how many microorganisms inhabit a 
given space or which traits contribute to the fitness of an organism (cases 
in which organisms per se are not being distinguished from anything 
else), it possesses a kind of valuative dimension.
Thus the defender of the strong concept of organism, not content 
to assert à la Heidegger that “science does not think” and end it 
there, will try and shift the conflict into the territory of science itself, 
within science itself, and will claim that there should be a science of 
the organism itself, a holistic science and even a new paradigm (as 
was frequently proclaimed about chaos theory and then self-organi-
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zation5) which would overcome or refute the excessively reductionist 
paradigm due to the Scientific Revolution. In some narratives, in-
cluding reductionist reconstructions of the history of biology pro-
vided by figures such as the biochemist Jacques Loeb (Allen 2005, 
and for a similar argument from a historian’s point of view, Schiller 
1978), this paradigm is presented – positively of course – as being 
subsequently reinforced by the mechanization of the circulatory sys-
tem with Harvey and Descartes, and Friedrich Wöhler’s synthesis 
of urea in 1828. The latter event signifies the artificial production 
of organic substance by non-organic components, which rendered 
invalid the claim that the chemistry of the living body is categorically 
distinct from that of inanimate bodies (Brooke 1968; McKie 1944). 
In anti-reductionist narratives at least since Husserl’s Crisis, the Sci-
entific Revolution is frequently taken as a target for demystifying 
what should not have been demystified, and thus somehow severing 
the link between humanity and Nature, thus bringing about both the 
original explanatory gap(s), the problem of qualia (which, it is true, is 
a Scientific Revolution invention – Galileo’s), human alienation and 
the exploitation of Nature (Merchant 1980).
A less emotional version of this sort of narrative is the theoretical bi-
ologist Robert Rosen’s assertion that the Newtonian revolution erases 
the distinction between the organic and the inorganic. All material sys-
tems can be analyzed as groups of particles moving in force fields (with 
the relevant dynamical equations; Rosen 1985, 167). Darwin and espe-
cially Claude Bernard would have been surprised to learn that they were 
working in a scientific context in which there no longer was any distinc-
tion between the organic and the inorganic! Faced with this gradual 
process of mechanization and molecularization, the eminent scientist 
Niels Bohr claimed, if you want to push the observation of an organ-
ism as far as possible from the point of view of atomic theory, you will 
have to undertake an intervention that kills it.6 We often encounter the 
judgment that so-called quantitative approaches lack finesse and miss 
something crucial about the qualitative dimensions of experience (mind, 
life, consciousness, etc.); the quantitative approach lacks a “feeling for 
the organism,” to borrow Evelyn Fox Keller’s (1983) phrase. Even when 
Jonas is avoiding overt normative language, he still declares that “waiv-
ing the intelligibility of life” (i.e., allowing the third-person descriptions 
5 In Küppers 1990, self-organization is presented as the greatest paradigm shift in science so far.
6 Bohr 1993, 458a; 1961, 22. On Bohr’s anti-reductionism about biological entities see Hoyningen-
Huene 1994.
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of scientists to trump the fact of human “inwardness”) has the conse-
quence of “rendering the world unintelligible as well” (Jonas 1966, 25).7
Whether or not one accepts the verdict of mainstream science that 
the organism in itself either does not exist or does not matter (both mo-
lecular biology and evolutionary biology concur here in denying any in-
herent reality to the organism8), the problem is that most defenses or 
challenges have something deeply value-laden about them. It is in the 
name of a certain idea of value that one defends a particularity of life or 
living being. For example, consider the expression, “pro-life!” To that 
position which says that there is something about life which prior to ar-
gument is valuative, that is, normative in a desirable way, one can reply 
with Nietzsche’s comment in the Gay Science that “Life is not an argu-
ment. Among the conditions of life might be error” (Nietzsche 2001, § 
121, 117), a comment which resonates with the Epicurean, anti-teleo-
logical, anti-finalist tradition, but which can also be heard in Darwinian 
terms. We need to evaluate this value in order to see if a certain kind of 
suspicion towards techno-science, AI, Darwinism, and reductionism in 
general is fully aware of what it is defending when it invokes the innate 
value of life or living being (le vivant, das Lebendige). In addition, such 
criticisms generally fail to take account of the obvious fact that Dar-
winism in almost all its forms is an anti-reductionist discipline or set of 
disciplines, either because they confuse a debunking dimension – Den-
nett’s “universal acid” – with reductionism proper, or more confusingly, 
because they build a narrative of the “Death of Nature” sort (Merchant 
1980) and view Darwin as having proposed “mechanisms” of life, hence 
completing the evil task begun by Descartes and others.9 
If, at the conclusion of this investigation we still have a useful concept 
of organism, I suggest it would have to be compatible with the following 
three conditions.
First, neither the human being nor the earthworm is, to speak with 
7 Anti-reductionist arguments are usually answered either by saying “it works!” (from medical 
materialism and psychophysics in the 19th century to molecular and genetic responses such as Loeb, 
Crick and Dawkins in the 20th century), or by showing how mechanism as a concept and mechanisms 
as things are more complex and diverse than the antireductionist thinks (Machamer, Darden and 
Craver 2000; Bechtel 2007; discussed below in § 4). It would be interesting in addition to show that 
the antireductionist’s history of science is often mistaken (cf. Thomson 1988; Gaukroger 2000; and 
Wolfe 2010b for possible illustrations).
8 This maps onto Mayr’s distinction between functional and evolutionary biology; see Pradeu 2010.
9 This goes hand-in-hand with the philosophically careless statement that Darwin was (for good or 
bad) the “Newton of a blade of grass” that Kant had said could not exist. That Darwinism is in many 
ways anti-reductionist or at least at odds with traditional reductionist programs does not however 
entail Robert Rosen’s claim that “Evolution has come to do for biology today what vitalism did for it 
previously” (Rosen 1991, 255).
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Spinoza, a dominion within a dominion, an empire within an empire or 
kingdom within a kingdom (an imperium in imperio, in Spinoza’s phrase 
from the Preface to Book III of the Ethics, in which he rejects the idea 
of a separate nature), including in the sense in which its interiority, sub-
jectivity or intentionality would in extremis come and extract it from 
cold and inhuman (mechanical) causality. As Canguilhem put it in terms 
closer to von uexküll’s Umwelt, “the environment of man’s sensitive and 
technical values is no more real, taken in itself, than the specific environ-
ment of the woodlouse or the gray mouse” (Canguilhem 1965, 154; cf. 
Wolfe, ms. 2009). Second, if the idea of reducing an organism to its com-
ponents presents any danger, one would have to show why, rather than 
use the term reductionism as a term of opprobrium. I am not saying that 
all critiques of reductionism are mistaken. Indeed, below I will briefly 
try and present Kurt Goldstein’s careful and original arguments for his 
projective and implicative brand of holism cum anti-reductionism. Third, 
if the organism exists in an entirely physical universe composed of physi-
cal elements, it will not be as an entity existing beyond the physical, like 
a vital force outside of causality. There can be no particular signature of 
entities like Walter Elsasser’s organismic law of the 1960s (e.g. Elsasser 
1964, 64; see also Elsasser 1961, 28, 30, 35). This is not to say that there 
is no “radical inhomogeneity” at “some level of organization” (Elsasser 
1964, 54, 63), but such special organizational definitions are precisely 
the sorts of definitions I suggested I would not treat as viable answers, 
for categorical reasons.
On the contrary, given these conditions, if we continue to maintain a 
concept of organism, it would seem that it would have to be in a purely 
instrumental and relational sense, although there is something unsatis-
fying about the purely instrumentalist view, as I shall indicate in clos-
ing. When biology explains a phenomenon, what does it do? It seeks to 
identify the causes thereof and subsume them under laws. In a universe 
supposed to be exhaustively governed by the laws of physics, reduction 
is associated with the possibility of reducing the laws described by biol-
ogy to the laws of physics and chemistry. The biologist could continue to 
speak of organisms or genes, but merely as conventional or instrumental 
terms. They belong (on this view) to an already superseded ontology. 
The question for the philosopher of biology would be, is this entity real 
or not? The instrumentalist position denies the essential existence of an 
entity apart from the physical universe and insists that the ontological 
commitments of a science are conventional. I will accept this instrumen-
talist proviso but will try and to give it a slightly more operational mean-
ing. That is, if the organism cannot claim to have a privileged status, as in 
the renewal of Aristotelianism hoped for by some (for example, Marjorie 
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Grene10) and if the organism cannot claim to be the basis for a holistic 
science, the goal of which is to defend some value of living being faced 
with artificiality (cloning, biotechnology, and the like) or mechanization, 
than it can still have an existence other than the limbo to which it is con-
demned in molecular biology.
For instance, one can argue for a concept of organism as possessing its 
own historicity or temporality, which was expressed by Merleau-Ponty 
in very Goldsteinian terms as the corps propre, i.e. the type of private, 
ineffable relation i can have to my body which is not the same as the 
scientist’s relation. Patricia Churchland has wittily challenged, not the 
existence of such relations but rather their uniqueness, pointing out in 
perfectly embodied fashion that we can claim to have a first-person, priv-
ileged relation to all sorts of physical things, including our stomach and 
bowels, in a state of “awareness of visceral circumstance” (Churchland 
1988, 282). Similarly, as regards ineffable subjectivity, Bill Lycan notes 
that while it may be true that “I can refer to my pain using a concept 
that no one else can use to refer to my pain,” and a bat (in a well-known 
example) can also “refer to its sonar sensation using a concept that no 
human could use,” it does not however follow “that the bat knows or 
understands a different fact” (Lycan 1990, 121). The ontological status 
of organisms and debates about qualia, explanatory gaps, and the hard 
problem are less far removed than they might appear (this similarity at 
the level of subjectivity and inwardness is in addition to better-known 
shared problems such as the role of functions and teleological expla-
nations, see Kraemer 1984). More recently Varela has also insisted on 
a kind of irreducible first-personness, under the influence of Merleau-
Ponty, with a newer emphasis on the project of a “first-person science.”11 
However much some elements of this phenomenological interpre-
tation provide interesting material on how organisms construct their 
worlds, I would also advocate a healthy suspicion towards this reinvest-
ment by phenomenology, inasmuch as in this discourse organism seems 
to serve as an excuse to reiterate anti-naturalistic points about the sub-
ject or subjectivity. There is an anti-naturalist war machine in this tradi-
tion, launched by Husserl, perpetuating the old stiffness of the Cartesian 
cogito faced with the world of nature: “it is only when the mind ceases to 
naïvely turn towards the outside and returns to itself, in order to dwell 
10 Contemporary calls to return to what is called an “Aristotelian” perspective on nature over and 
against a perspective inherited from the Scientific Revolution include Jonas 1966; Grene 1968; Kass 
1999. Kass is a prominent bioethicist who calls Jonas “[his] first real teacher in philosophical biol-
ogy” (Kass 1995, 4). Changeux makes a helpful comment on the absurdity of trying to “return” to 
Aristotelianism in science in Changeux and Ricoeur 2002, 206-207.
11 Varela and Shear 1999; for useful criticisms of the idea of a first-person science see Dennett 2001.
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in itself, purely in itself, that it can be self-sufficient” (Husserl 1970, 
297; translation modified). The extreme form of this insistence on sub-
jectivity and the opposition between flesh and body is Merleau-Ponty’s 
sacralization of the living organism, when he equates the sensation of an 
embodied being to a mystical communion with divine presence (Mer-
leau-Ponty 1962, 212). Of the figures we shall discuss, neither Goldstein 
nor Varela share this extreme, almost mystical way of presenting the or-
ganism. However, Varela retains this old insistence on the sovereignty 
of the individual over and against what he perceives as an impersonal 
evolutionary process. 
I maintain that evolutionary thought, through its emphasis on diversity, 
reproduction, and the species in order to explain the dynamics of change, has 
obscured the necessity of looking at the autonomous nature of living units for the 
understanding of biological phenomenology. Also I think that the maintenance 
of identity and the invariance of defining relations in the living unities are at 
the base of all possible ontogenic and evolutionary transformation in biological 
systems. (Varela 1979, 5)
Goldstein has moments where he speaks of the organism’s life as 
somehow out of ordinary time, reaching an almost eternal state of self-
creation. It is clear that if such theories are to be pertinent in a broadly 
naturalistic sense, we need to add – aside from additional philosophi-
cal translation – Darwinian constraints on Goldstein or Varela’s sheer 
positivity of organism. The organism is not a solitary, self-creating art-
ist! Here the need becomes clear for a dialectical, interactionist vision 
of organism which is Darwinian-compatible and for that reason not so 
solipsistic, along the lines of Lewontin’s view that, “The environment is 
not an autonomous process but a reflection of the biology of the species. 
Just as there is no organism without an environment, so there is no envi-
ronment without an organism” (Lewontin 1983/1985, 99).12
IV
To see how one might arrive at this understanding of organism, it 
is helpful to look historically again at how the notion appeared. It was 
12 Lewontin’s “dialectical” and Oyama’s “interactionist” theories of organism and environment as 
systems are by no means the same, but they are frequently discussed together and for present purposes 
serve as “flagbearers” of various movements to remove the organism from its Romantic solitude and 
consider it as one of many interacting entities (but without, conversely, reducing this process to a 
dematerialized, holistic theory either, as I discuss in closing). I am grateful to Thomas Pradeu for past 
conversations on these topics.
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against the background of, or in contradistinction to, the notion of ma-
chine. The mechanical philosophy – Boyle, Hobbes, and Descartes but 
also iatromechanism as a research program in physiology and medicine, 
with figures such as Giorgio Baglivi and Hermann Boerhaave – rested 
on the notion that natural phenomena result from interactions between 
material particles governed by the laws of mechanics. This enabled the 
formulation of laws of motion and the invention of particular mecha-
nisms (from clockwork to Vaucanson’s mechanical duck), the latter al-
lowing one to explain particular phenomena. Baglivi stated in 1696 that 
he wanted to carry out a program which would demonstrate that “the 
human body is nothing other than a complex system of mechanical and 
chemical motions obeying mathematical laws” (Baglivi 1696, I, xi, §§ 
6-7). In an equally influential 1703 lecture – explicitly entitled “The use-
fulness of the Mechanical Method in Medicine” – Boerhaave stated with 
even more ontological surety that “the human body is in its nature the 
same as the whole of the universe which is open to our view” (Boer-
haave 1703/1983, 96). 
What is curious is that biology – the science of life – emerges in this 
period. Biology is constituted for and by a mechanical, mechanistic model 
which is itself blind to the concept of life. Of course, the very fact that 
this model, or family of models, was so productive might lead one to 
suspect that the model was not so blind!13 This point has been nicely 
brought to light, specifically with regard to the Paris Académie des Sci-
ences, by Salomon-Bayet (1978). The Académie was set up to investi-
gate natural phenomena on a mechanistic, Cartesian basis and yet from 
the outset its own reports, on natural history, physiology, and anatomy 
(including the famous “querelle des monstres,” see Wolfe 2005) contra-
dicts that basis in all sorts of ways. Similarly, if one looked closely at La 
Mettrie’s famous L’Homme-Machine of 1748, one would find out that it 
is not really very mechanistic, at least in the traditional sense; that is, it 
aims at locating some of the physiological mechanisms particular to liv-
ing, organic beings (Thomson 1988) without thereby eliminating all spe-
cifically organic properties in favour of mechanical ones (Wolfe 2010b). 
More than a century later, Claude Bernard stated that scientifically “we 
13 That the opposition between machines and organisms or mechanism and teleology is much less 
obvious than it appears, even in the early modern period, is a topic that goes beyond the scope of the 
present paper. Consider Boyle’s “hydraulico-pneumatic” model for the human body (and his defence 
of final causes); even Cartesian mechanistic physiology, far from denying the existence of goal-directed 
processes, was in fact replete with functional language, e.g. when discussing the circulation of blood 
and the motion of heart. The Cartesian point (following a suggestion in Gaukroger 2000) is not that 
bodies actually are machines (an eliminativist view) but rather that the structure and behaviour of 
bodies are to be explained in the same way that we explain the structure and behaviour of machines (a 
reductionist view). See also Wolfe (2010a; 2010b).
208 CHARLES T. WOLFE
are right to treat the organism like a machine,” but he immediately in-
troduces a somewhat puzzling distinction. We are “mistaken when we 
treat it as a mechanical machine, fixed and unchanging.” Rather, “the 
organism is an organic machine, which possesses a flexible mechanism, 
thanks to special organic processes which exist therein; but these do not 
transgress any of the general laws of mechanics, physics or chemistry” 
(Bernard 1937, cit. in Canguilhem 1989, 552).
Physiologists such as Walter Cannon, theoretical biologists such as 
Francisco Varela and philosophers such as William Bechtel have, in 
their respective ways, each promoted this Bernardian concept of an “or-
ganic machine” (as a homeostatic, autopoietic, or organizational whole 
comprised of micro-mechanisms) and, indeed, we have here a rare case 
where the historical and the conceptual complexities seem to cohere, 
around the status of “mechanism” (weak or strong), “mechanisms” (as 
pluralistic) and “mechanical models” (as essentially heuristic). The core 
insight derived from this is that a mechanical model is nothing else than a 
heuristic model designed to explain something about the object which ‘or-
ganicists’ seek a monopoly on, namely Life. Recent work on mechanism, 
like recent reevaluations of organisation or “animal economy,” tend to 
blur the divide between the two concepts.14 Mechanism, Bechtel sug-
gests, can provide an adequate account of organization (a more struc-
tural word for organism) by “placing as much emphasis on understand-
ing the particular ways in which biological mechanisms are organized 
as it has on discovering the component parts of the mechanisms and 
their operations” (Bechtel 2007, 270). There is an important dialectical 
relationship between the mechanistic explanatory programme to study 
(by reduction, modeling, and componential analysis) the structures at 
work in organisms and the organicist (vitalist, holist) standpoint which 
minimally “remind[s] mechanists of the shortfalls of the mechanistic ac-
counts on offer” for ideas such as “negative feedback, self-organizing 
positive feedback, and cyclic organization are critical to explaining the 
phenomena exhibited by living organisms” (Bechtel 2007, 296-297).
Vitalistically inclined figures such as Bichat and Bernard, in Bechtel’s 
argument (to which one can add the Montpellier vitalist Barthez a gen-
eration earlier), usefully formulate challenges to the mechanistic model 
(without, one might add, offering any foundationalist ontological rejec-
tion of it). Indeed, it is a characteristic trait of all these thinkers to re-
ject their predecessors as “vitalists,” obviously in a pejorative sense, and 
also target earlier (iatro-)mechanists such as Baglivi or Boerhaave for not 
14 Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Bechtel 2007; Wolfe and Terada 2008, §§ 4-6. For a 
contrary view, reiterating the value – scientific and philosophical – of the opposition, see Gierer 1996.
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fulfilling their scientific obligations. Théophile de Bordeu, a prominent 
Montpellier vitalist physician, complained explicitly about the obscu-
rantism of some his teachers in his 1775 Recherches sur les maladies chro-
niques. “We used to ask . . . what this vital principle that was responsible 
for night and day (qui opère le blanc et le noir), and governed that which 
was opposed to it” (Bordeu 1818, vol. 2, 972). But a short time later, Cu-
vier includes Bordeu amongst the culprits. Stahlian animism, he claims, 
was taken on in modified form by the Montpellier vitalists “in addition 
to the contradictions and metaphysical obscurity generated by a pur-
ported local sensibility without perception, which all these physicians 
found to exist in particular organs, and some still maintain, one can also 
reproach them for over-using [the notion of] what they termed the vital 
principle, using this occult entity quite vaguely, in order to attribute to 
it all the phenomena they found difficult to explain” (Cuvier 1810, II, 
232). The point is not just that vitalists frequently have to define them-
selves over and against vitalist predecessors, who they have to portray 
as being overly metaphysical and lacking experimental backing for their 
ideas, it is also that this rhetorical complexity is part of the nature of 
concepts such as organism or organization. Both are meant to explain 
the special features of living organisms, while also being concepts open 
to the mechanist (for further discussion of this sort of rhetorical tension 
surrounding terms like vitalism, see Oyama 2010).
An interesting point raised by Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. (the jux-
taposition of the two points is mine, not theirs; Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria 
et al. 2000, 231) is that organism may not be a necessary or necessar-
ily interesting organizing point for biological inquiry, inasmuch as some 
biological fields will simply not need to make use of the concept. At 
the same time, it is a kind of primitive which cannot be reduced to its 
components, even if these are construed as mechanisms (which might be 
construed in the above sense of homeostatic wholes composed of vari-
ous micromechanisms). Indeed, for every “uniquely biological concept” 
such as homeostasis (whether we take this as a merely empirical concept 
or in its more hypostatized form as a kind of ontological marker of life), 
there is a deflationary and mechanistically specifiable concept that will 
match it, such as H. Ross Ashby’s “homeostat.” But this should not entail 
that we dispense with all properties of organisms in favour of the prop-
erties of familiar machines. Rather, following intuitions of Boerhaave, La 
Mettrie, and Bernard, mechanisms, organization, and organisms should 
be understood more dialectically as interrelated concepts.
In sharp contrast to this vision in which organisms are real but not 
categorically separate from mechanisms or, put differently, that their re-
ality is organizational rather than somehow essential to the extent that a 
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degree of interpretation (of projection, of heuristics) is incorporated in 
the concept of organism, we find the vision of organisms as paramount, 
embodied subjectivities. One must note that this is both equally compel-
ling and equally congenial to common sense on some definitions (Den-
nett has written at great lengths about the feeling we have that “someone 
is home” when we are faced with a human, an animal, or a particularly 
mobile intentional agent of the robot variety) and has been espoused by 
a variety of important thinkers, as I indicate below. That does not mean 
it is a good argument or a satisfactory picture of what organisms are.
When Kant famously declares that there will never be a Newton of a 
blade of grass (“it is absurd for human beings . . . to hope that perhaps 
some day another Newton might arise who would explain to us, in terms 
of natural laws unordered by any intention, how even a mere blade of 
grass is produced,” Kant 1790/1987, § 75, 282-283), or when Leibniz 
insists that the difference between a machine of nature and an artificial 
machine is that a machine of nature, a living being, is a machine to infin-
ity, they are both clinging to the idea of an invisible inside or interiority 
which constructions and reconstructions cannot grasp.
Moreover, by means of the soul or form there is a true unity corresponding to 
what is called the SELF [moi] in us; such a unity could not occur in artificial 
machines or in a mere mass of matter, however organized it may be; such a mass 
can only be considered as an army or a herd, or a pond full of fish, or like a watch 
composed of springs and wheels. (Leibniz 1695/1978, 482)
This closely resembles the view known as “agent causation” in action 
theory and moral philosophy more broadly. Just as the above descrip-
tions of what a living agent (organism) is, stress that its unity is derived 
from a particular type of selfhood or internal unity, versus the “masses”or 
“aggregates” encountered in physical nature overall, theorists of agent 
causation insist that acts flow from an agent in a way completely differ-
ent to, and unexplainable in terms of, the causal processes at work in the 
rest of the natural world. Agent causation was a prominent view in ac-
tion theory starting in the 1960s and is sometimes traced back to Thomas 
Reid, but an early practitioner is in fact the Cambridge Platonist Ralph 
Cudworth, insisting in his posthumous treatise on free will that the soul 
exercises “hegemonic” control over itself: “ye whole Soule Redoubled 
upon it Selfe, which being as it were within it Selfe, and comprehending 
it Selfe . . . hath a Sui potestas over it Selfe, and can command it Selfe 
or turne it Selfe this way and that way” (Cudworth 1838, § X, 36). The 
organism as subjectivity is very much this self “redoubled upon itself,” 
which cannot be grasped by any componential analysis.
In contrast, the artificialist position points to the heuristic dimension 
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of a mechanism as being built so as to see what’s inside it (in the sense 
articulated by the physicist William Thomson: “I am never content until 
I have constructed a mechanical model of the object that I am studying. 
If I succeed in making one, I understand; otherwise, I do not;” Thom-
son 1884, 270; Cassirer 1950, 115). Obviously, an organism construed in 
instrumental, relational and projective terms is not so far removed from 
such a mechanism. Does this prevent the biologist or the philosopher of 
biology from articulating laws of life? Not really. The specificity of life 
can be treated in functional terms, rather than arguing for a special sub-
stance (substantival vitalism). One can conceive of a functional vitalism, 
as Barthez (1806) did, using a Newtonian analogy. Call the vital force 
an X, an unknown, and that will allow me to formulate laws specific to 
living beings without making any ontological claims as to this force. To 
be precise, Barthez overtly says he will analyze the something that differ-
entiates living bodies from dead bodies like one analyzes the ‘unknown 
quantities’ of the geometricians: “The thing found in living beings which 
is not found in the dead, we shall call Soul, Archaeus, Vital Principle, X, 
Y, Z, like the unknown quantities of the geometricians. We only need to 
determine the value of this unknown, the assumption of which facilitates 
and shortens the calculation of phenomena” (Barthez 1806, vol. 1, 16). 
The idea is that the relevant biological property will be treated in the 
way that Newton treated gravity epistemologically, as “a (provisionally) 
inexplicable explicative device” (Hall 1968, 14). 
We might recognize in this functional vitalism a basic insight of func-
tionalism in the philosophy of mind. But just as an interrelated concept 
of mechanism and organism allows one to retain a dimension of em-
bodiment when dealing with mechanisms, and a dimension of structural 
or componential analysis when dealing with organisms, similarly, the 
defender of functional vitalism will still be preoccupied in explanatory 
terms with the fact that the systems she studies are alive, embodied in 
a particular kind of matter (Wolfe and Terada 2008). With respect to 
systems theories (a diverse family in which holism and functionalism can 
both be found), one must be careful not to leave out the matter.
V
In more purely conceptual terms, there is no a priori criterion that al-
lows one to distinguish a living being from a non-living being, whether 
the integrity of the organism, its self-regulation (homeostasis), or me-
tabolism (selected by Hans Jonas as a crucial distinguishing feature 
of organisms). After all, the defining claim of cybernetics was to have 
produced working models of just such features, rehabilitating purpo-
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sive concepts without any vitalist overtones).15 These features are always 
post facto observations, starting from within a temporal process. In that 
sense, the relation between living and non-living, organism and machine, 
is an empirical relation, which does not allow one to claim qualitative dif-
ferences between laws of nature. As Rosen says, “there is as yet no list of 
tests, characteristics or criteria we can apply to a given material system 
that can decide whether that system is an organism or not;” “the deci-
sion as to whether a given system is an organism is entirely a subjective, 
intuitive one, based on criteria that have so far resisted formalization” 
(Rosen 1985, 166-167).
In other words, given that the science of life is founded on mechanis-
tic concepts which in and of themselves deny the specificity of life (even 
if these concepts or models, like Vaucanson’s duck, are also heuristic 
models of the complexity of living systems), its construction of a bound-
ary concept called organism is necessarily a posteriori. What this entails 
is that any kind of strong (ontological) vitalism, strong claim about or-
ganism, essentialist-substantialist view, will be based on what is at best a 
heuristic fiction, which is not a problem (Wolfe 2006).
The term “heuristic fiction” refers to the Kantian point concerning 
organism as a regulative principle (instantiating the idea of a natural pur-
pose), a point reiterated in different ways by Goldstein and Dennett. 
Kant is extremely cautious about the possibility that “nature as a whole 
is an animal,” a giant organism, as it were. It does indeed help to support 
the hypothesis of the purposiveness of nature, but if we really believe it 
to be true we fall into a circle since we are attributing to nature proper-
ties we know in organized beings but can never know if nature possesses 
these properties itself (Kant 1790/1987, § 73, 276). Epistemologically, 
the point one can derive from Kant, Goldstein, and Dennett is that in 
order to be able to understand an entity we need to project certain fea-
tures onto it. But these features should not be held to be constitutive of 
certain regions of the real. Organism in this Kantian vein is a regulative 
ideal in the sense that it is something posited as necessary for our intel-
lects to be able to grasp a nightingale or an orang-outang as intentional 
agents. It is not a statement about the properties of the real. Much work 
has been done in recent years on Kant’s ideas and their significance for 
contemporary philosophy of biology (see Huneman 2007). The empha-
sis here is that for Kant, organism is a “reflective” construct rather than a 
15 Wiener explicitly focused on Cannon’s idea of homeostasis when defining what he called “nega-
tive feedback” (Keller 2008; 2009); hence Ashby’s choice of the term “homeostat” (Ashby 1948). 
Current cognitive science even discusses “homeostatic plasticity” in robots (Barandirian and Di Paolo 
2010).
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“constitutive” feature of reality, and reflective judgments are “incapable 
of justifying any objective assertions” (Kant 1790/1987, § 67, 259; § 73, 
277).16
In the shift from Kant to Goldstein and Dennett, what is new is that 
it is the organism itself that is being credited with this projective capacity. 
It has also been argued that the similarity between Kant’s regulative idea 
and Dennett’s intentional stance (Dennett 1987) indicates that Dennett’s 
naturalism fails, or is inadequate (Ratcliffe 2001). As I indicate below, I 
think the idea that we – along with other animals – are projectors, as it 
were, should not spell the end of any naturalistic project, except perhaps 
1950s behaviorism. Dennett’s intentional stance idea is meant to account 
for 
the ability of animals to make reliable predictions about the behavior of others 
given their complete ignorance of the biological mechanisms that govern 
behavior. Since we ordinarily have no access to the internal mechanisms governing 
the behavior of our fellow creatures, we must adopt . . . the intentional stance 
towards them. [This] is a strategy that begins with the assumption that other 
animals (including people) tend to pursue outcomes that serve their interests and 
that they have been equipped by natural selection with suitable perceptual and 
cognitive capacities . . . .(Symons 2002, 43)
In the case of Goldstein, there is more of an emphasis on the organism 
as a producer of intelligible totalities, as a system which actualizes itself 
and thereby enters into an adequate relation to its environment (Gold-
stein 1995, 325). But in both cases there is a sense that our cognitive or 
perceptual make-up is necessarily organismic, and, indeed, its being so 
contributes to our aptitude for survival. In contrast, the genuinely Kan-
tian view is not a description of any part of nature itself. It is, depending 
on the context, an epistemological view but is also a projective concept 
of organism.
Hegel and Schelling abandoned this Kantian self-limitation in their 
philosophies of nature as organism. Schelling described the organism 
as “the perfect mirror-image of the absolute in Nature and for Nature” 
16 Of course the posterity of Kant’s ideas in biology has little to do with his own strictures on how 
to approach organic life. Not only were the self-limitations of the critical philosophy ignored or delib-
erately reversed by Romantics, Naturphilosophen, Idealists such as Hegel and Schelling (Huneman 
2006) but Kant has also served as a source of new biological ideas (including self-organization) repeat-
edly in the later 20th and early 21st centuries (e.g. Weber and Varela 2002), in ways he would not have 
approved of. Even Konrad Lorenz was part of this trend, contributing an essay to the Yearbook of the 
Society for General Systems Theory on how to interpret Kant’s notion of the a priori and the categories 
in the light of contemporary biology. Lorenz argues that the categories and our structures of percep-
tion overall are evolutionary adaptations of our nervous system to pressures of the real, natural world 
(Lorenz 1975).
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(Schelling 1988, 51). For Hegel and Schelling, the task of writing a 
philosophy of nature is in large part in order to articulate a philosophy 
of organism, as a cosmic principle, an account of the universe itself as 
organic. To illustrate this tension, one can think of Goethe’s story in 
Poetry and Truth (chapter IX), in which he describes his excitement 
upon ordering d’Holbach’s System of Nature, because of its title, which 
for Goethe implied an animate, pantheistic universe; when it arrived, 
he was horrified at this “dark and cadaverous work.”17 Goethe stands 
for philosophy of nature as an attack upon mechanistic and quantitative 
science and its principle. He had mistakenly thought the System of Nature 
belonged to his intellectual family. This fits quite symmetrically with 
his response to Kant: “the Critique of Judgment fell into my hands and 
with this book a wonderful period came into my life” (“The influence 
of modern philosophy”, cit. in Huneman 2006, 665). Judith Schlanger 
says nicely that Goethe “overevaluated organicity as individual life” 
(Schlanger 1971, 108).18
For different reasons, but always motivated by a certain concept of 
organism, usually buttressed by certain empirical claims (about embryo 
development, metabolism, or just the sovereignty of human beings in the 
natural universe, notably because of their particular mode of awareness 
or inwardness), the same ontologization of organism occurs in Driesch, 
Jonas, and those who favor a revival of Aristotelianism. While Jonas 
(and differently, Varela) are making claims about individuality and 
self-awareness, Driesch’s argument for the uniqueness of organism via 
entelechies is the classic case of scientific concepts that have been oddly 
hypostatized. While his experiments had shown that perfectly normal 
organisms could develop from embryos which had suffered from severe 
injuries produced by the experiment – thus, whole organisms resulted 
from abnormal growth conditions – Driesch derived from this the 
consequence that since the “formative power” at work is not interfered 
with by division, separation or displacement, “it must be a ‘something’ 
without spatial character and to which no definite position in space can 
be assigned.”19 This was an entelechy. 
Others (e.g. Schlick 1953, but also unexpected figures such as Bakhtin, 
see Bakhtin 1992) have pointed to the mistakes in scientific reasoning 
here. I only wish to emphasize that Driesch is one of a variety of figures 
17 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, XI, in Goethe 1887-1919, pt. 1, vol. 28, 69.
18 On the shift from regulative ideals to the ontologization of organism and/or vital force, see 
Larson 1979; Richards 2002; Reill 2005; for more on this aspect of Kantian thought cf. Huneman 
2007; 2010.
19 Driesch 1908, I, B, “The Foundations of the Physiology of Development”: “Experiments on the 
Egg of the Sea-urchin.”
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for whom the reality of organisms is an essential fact, including in the 
sense that it flows from their essence. The mistake that concerns us here 
is that of turning potentially significant facts about embryo development 
into ontologically irreducible features. Where Driesch posits an entity 
that actually does not exist, the entelechy, Jonas makes the same kind of 
mistake, but on the basis of features that do exist, such as metabolism 
and homeostasis. This is basically what D’Arcy Thompson criticized Hal-
dane for: “The alleged phenomena of self-production, self-maintenance, 
and self-regulation are the common currency of those who, finding the 
mechanistic theory difficult and unsatisfactory, are content to postulate 
a something ‘which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical 
reactions’” (Thompson, in: Haldane, Thompson et al. 1918, 12). This 
form of “ontologization” is to be opposed to the projective view of Kurt 
Goldstein (just as it is to Kant’s view).
VI
One can distinguish, then, between a methodological (the functional 
view, or what Goldstein calls constructivist and I call projective) vision 
of organism and an ontological vision of organism (the ontologization of 
organism against which Kant argues).20 However, I will not be content 
with reiterating this opposition, for both of these familiar positions suffer 
either from being impoverished or over-nourished. The methodological 
view is closely tied to the instrumental conception of biology and even 
more closely tied to functional conceptions, which run the risk of leaving 
out the matter in which systems are realized entirely. And the ontological 
view tells us too much; it should be possible to argue for an ontological 
status of organisms, e.g. in Bernardian realist terms, without being com-
mitted either to entelechies, contemplative inwardness, or eternal life.
In the 20th century, the ontological vision is espoused variously by 
figures including Driesch, Jonas, and Ruyer. This tension between a 
methodological, constructivist view and an ontological, essentialist view 
also runs through a good deal of biological thought. For instance, the 
methodological vision is compatible with functional vitalism. The Vi-
enna Circle critique, beginning with Schlick, targets Driesch for not re-
specting the causal closure principle. Rather than being content with this 
response to the vitalist, my projection of intentional traits onto X serves 
20 This distinction unwittingly, but fittingly mirrors the first two out of three in Ayala’s distinc-
tion between methodological, ontological, and theoretical reduction (Ayala 1974), although the latter 
would probably find an analogue in programs such as systems biology (one can imagine correlating 
“homeostatic property clusters” of different kinds of organismic wholes, real and simulated).
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an evolutionary purpose, rather than treating X as a mass of molecules. 
Hence, in this way the Kantian-Goldsteinian view can be augmented in 
Darwinian fashion, in which the capacity of certain types of embodied 
agents to project organismic features onto other agents would reflect 
some part of their evolutionary history. This Darwinian dimension ad-
ditionally allows for an approach to organisms other than the once-om-
nipresent non-reductive physicalism. It does not force one to hold that 
higher-level entities such as tigers and buttercups are constructs while 
the entities of physics are somehow more real (sometimes instrumental-
ist arguments rely on a kind of lazy sophism gesturing towards a physi-
calist ontology, from which one gains little; cf. Wilson 2006.
When drawing distinctions between two ways of viewing the concept 
of organism, it is important to note that Goldstein himself can be read 
both ways. On the one hand, he defends a strong, Goethean-ontological 
view he calls holistic and, on the other hand, he articulates a heuristic/
methodological perspective as an approach to the brain-damaged pa-
tient’s reconstituting of a personal unity.21 Goldstein points empirically 
to the fact of the property of our brains to construct unity or totality 
as a normal state, but also in response to abnormal situations. But he 
also ontologizes this into a property of the organism that somehow re-
moves it from the world of causality and mechanistic natural science. 
However, he wants to go on calling this biology. Is he a vitalist? Clearly, 
not in the sense of Driesch. And his concept of organism is not a self-
production in the sense of a strong vitalism, since it is an interplay or 
debate (Auseinandersetzung) between internal needs and the environ-
ment (his fundamental biological law [biologisches Grundgesetz], which 
Goldstein sometimes equates with Wertheimer’s prägnanz or pregnanz 
law in Gestalt psychology, even if he also expresses caution about ap-
plying the laws from one field to another and thus does not think one 
can directly have a Gestalt biology [Goldstein 1995, 285]). However, 
contrary to Pavlov or Sherrington, Goldstein’s holism describes behav-
ior, not in a localized sense as a reaction to an event in the environment, 
but as a function of organic totality, or even a kind of biological a priori 
that the organism always strives to achieve or attain (hence his frequent 
reference to actualization and self-actualization), as an individual norm. 
There is something metaphysical here. The position defined as instru-
mental, methodological, constructivist, or above all, projective, benefits 
21 Much of Goldstein 1995 is devoted to the problem and remains one of the major works on the 
topic. The first 2 chapters discuss empirical cases of brain-damaged patients in the process of rebuild-
ing a sense of a unified world; chapters 9 and 11 are particularly devoted to biological theory (parts 
and wholes, organic hierarchies, etc.).
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from insights drawn from the more methodologically oriented side of 
Goldstein’s account. (No work that I am aware of brings out these two 
dimensions in Goldstein, certainly not the discussion of holism; Canguil-
hem’s own philosophy of life, inspired by Goldstein, comes closest.22)
At this point a word of clarification is in order. It may seem as if I have 
presented an opposition between two views, a strong and a weak view of 
organism, and shown how the strong view is committed to various kinds 
of anti-naturalistic and perhaps solipsistic tenets which make it difficult 
to embrace as a view of organism consonant with our “best knowledge” 
of biological practice. While this may be true, the problem then remains 
as to what the weak view is and if there is only one. Indeed, if we turn to 
weak theories of organism, there is something very appealing about the 
instrumental view (organism is a useful concept inasmuch as it captures 
some of the empirical material we need to work out, but it can be dis-
carded in favour of any other pragmatically useful concept; very much 
a functionalist view) and what I have called the projective view is partly 
related to this. The projective view, holds that organism is something we 
project onto the world, a kind of construction of intelligibility. It is then 
an epistemological version of the concept of organism, admittedly with 
a Darwinian twist when Dennett (partly anticipated by Konrad Lorenz, 
see Lorenz 1975) suggests that higher organisms need to be able to proj-
ect what Goldstein would have called organismic totality onto certain 
types of agents, minimally for survival reasons, to which one could add 
various accounts of sociality, Machiavellian intelligence, and the like. 
But none of these views give us any purchase on realist notions of the 
organism as they existed – without metaphysical underpinnings – in the 
work of major figures in the history of biology, such as Claude Bernard. 
If we need such systems to make our theories come out right, then there 
is a sense in which organisms are part of our ontology, whatever the 
molecular stance may be.23 
VII
If the organism does not exist as such, there is no use in crying “reduc-
tionist!” in the face of de-naturing instances like cloning or prostheses! 
Much as Claude Bernard had stated that “there is only one physiology,”24 
22 Canguilhem explicitly credits Goldstein with influencing him on this point in the essay “The Normal 
and the Pathological” (Canguilhem 2008, 129, 132). For further discussion of this relationship see Borck, 
Hess and Schmidgen 2005, especially the contribution by A. Métraux; Wolfe (forthcoming).
23 Thanks to Dominic Murphy for helping me see this more clearly.
24 “Il n’y a qu’une seule manière de vivre, qu’une seule physiologie pour tous les êtres vivants” 
(Bernard 1885, 3e leçon, “Division des phénomènes de la vie,” § III : “Réfutation générale des théories 
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we could broadly add that there are not two natures but one Nature. But 
is there not something that distinguishes higher organisms from the rest 
of the natural imperium? One can answer, with Goldstein, in the affirma-
tive: individuality (Goldstein was in fact quite careful not to make claims 
for the uniqueness of human beings within the natural world, a mistake 
he diagnosed in the philosophical anthropology tradition). In a type of 
argument going back to Aristotle, the suggestion is to look around, and 
organisms are in fact the best candidates for individual substances. Or-
ganisms are “paradigmatic individuals”25 or, as Gilbert Simondon put 
it, the production of a living being is a process of individuation.26 One 
could also adduce Claude Bernard’s notion of milieu intérieur and his 
insistence that the organism must be treated as an individuality: “the 
physiologist and the physician must never forget that the living being 
comprises an organism and an individuality . . . If we decompose the liv-
ing organism into its various parts, it is only for the sake of experimental 
analysis, not for them to be understood separately” (Bernard 1865/1984, 
II, ii, § 1, 137).
This individuality can also be conceived of phenomenologically 
through the features of temporality and historicity, as in Goldstein’s state-
ment, “The organism is a historical being” (Goldstein 1995, 387). Does 
Goldstein just mean that the organism has a capacity to provide adaptive 
responses to the problems or challenges posed by the environment, as it 
selects the relevant events occurring in that environment (84)? While he 
does say this, he also goes on in more “Goethean” form (thereby match-
ing the duality of methodological and ontological levels of his analysis) 
to say that “the organism is a being enduring in time,” and curiously 
enough “in eternal time, for it does not commence with procreation, 
certainly not with birth, and does not end with death” (387). We are 
reminded of his rather Romantic insistence on the organism’s perpetual 
self-actualization, which lacks a recognition of life’s more Darwinian 
challenges. “Life always has a positive character, it never manifests itself 
dualistes de la vie entre les animaux et les végétaux,” 148-149). Similarly, in his summary and presenta-
tion of Bernard’s lectures, Paul Bert denies that there could be “two contradictory natures giving rise 
to two opposed orders of science” (Bernard 1885, xxviii-xxix).
25 Schlanger 1971, 42; Hull 1992, 182. On the individuality of organisms in a related sense see 
Symons 2010; Pradeu 2010.
26 Canguilhem and Simondon have in common the project of defending a particular notion of indi-
viduation within the biological realm itself, in the sense that “life is not possible without the individu-
ation of living beings”. However, what distinguishes Simondon from this Goldsteinian trend is that 
he does not at all wish to reassert a metaphysics of the individual as an insurpassable term, but rather 
to “processualize” the individual, to display the individual as the result of a process of individuation. 
For Simondon, it is not the individual who is the ground of the process of individuation, but rather 
individuation which grounds the individual.
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in negative terms” (388-389). Notice that, while Goldstein’s phrasing 
may make him seem remote at times from current biological theoriz-
ing, the view of the organism as a type of entity which either can be 
understood apart from evolutionary models and explanations, or indeed 
should be understood in such a way, is alive and well.
We cannot answer the question . . . “Why is a machine alive”? with the answer 
“Because its ancestors were alive”. Pedigrees, lineages, genealogies and the like, 
are quite irrelevant to the basic question. Ever more insistently over the past 
century, and never more so than today, we hear the argument that biology is 
evolution; that living systems instantiate evolutionary processes rather than life; 
and ironically, that these processes are devoid of entailment, immune to natural 
law, and hence outside of science completely. To me it is easy to conceive of life, 
and hence biology, without evolution. (Rosen 1991, 254-255; for a more cautious 
claim about understanding organisms apart from evolution see Wouters 2005)
This is not so different from Varela’s view that living systems need not 
or should not be grasped in evolutionary terms. But here I wish to em-
phasize the more naturalistic part of Goldstein’s point: the organism not 
only responds to challenges in real time, but has a temporal essence. As 
Skarda and Freeman put it, the difference between biological agents and 
non-biological agents is that non-biological agents do not operate under 
global constraints (neural or organismic; for more discussion of the spe-
cific constraints operating in organisms see Mossio and Moreno 2010):
Storms, for example, are self-organized phenomena that can be mathematically 
modeled using the same principles we use to model neural dynamics. A storm takes 
in and gives out energy. . . . Storms, however, do not exhibit adaptive responses; 
. . . their system does not incorporate information about its environment. The 
storm may, for example, move towards land, but it does not do so under the 
constraint to survive as a unity. (Skarda and Freeman 1987, 173)
Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno call this autonomy rather than the broader 
term, unity. The capacity of a system to manage the flow of matter and 
energy through it so that it can, at the same time, regulate, modify, and 
control internal self-constructive processes and processes of exchange 
with the environment. Thus, the system must be able to generate and 
regenerate all the constraints, including part of its boundary conditions, 
that define it as such, together with its own particular way of interacting 
with the environment (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 240).
The organism is a temporal-historical being in dialogue with its envi-
ronment. However, this approach at times risks breaching the Kantian 
limit, making organism a category of meaning or value from the outset, 
not a posteriori. One can hold its unity (Skarda and Freeman), autono-
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my (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno) or totality (Goldstein) to be real without 
positing an essence, an ineffable something threatened by a universe of 
measures and formalizations. Even the convinced reductionist should be 
able to accept the existence of a rudimentary teleology which pulls the 
organism towards a desirable state, like homeostasis, and this opens onto 
a systems perspective. Von Bertalanffy felt that it was “hardly a matter 
of dispute” that “phenomena in the organism are chiefly whole-forming 
or system-forming in character and that it is the task of biology to es-
tablish whether and to what extent they are so;” however, he acknowl-
edged that the interpretive difficulty arises as soon as observers portray 
such forms of organization as embodying “will,” “purpose,” and “goals” 
(Bertalanffy 1932, in Cassirer 1950, 215). To repeat a formulation, one 
theorist’s homeostasis is another theorist’s homeostat; that is, for every 
purportedly irreducible and real form of organismic unity, there will be 
a model which seeks to reproduce it. 
However, contrary to defenders of the ontological vision of organism, 
there is no danger in the mechanistic picture which was the basis for 
the articulation of biology in the first place! Metaphysically, the position 
suggested here – Kant read a certain way, Goldstein read a certain way 
– is that the form of life is there for us. It is a heuristic construction, a 
projection which reflects our desire to understand x as a totality. That we 
are, by dint of our nervous systems, projectors does not mean we project 
any structure we choose onto the world. “To understand is always to 
construct a (meaningful) totality.”27 This is to be taken in intersubjective 
terms and there is no need to postulate a hidden interiority. Recall that 
organism, as a way of designating internal unity, served as a substitute 
for soul once there was no ghost in the machine to explain animation. 
It was exactly in those terms that Leibniz spoke of organisms, opposing 
the internal unity of organisms to the scattered heaps of matter or at best 
aggregates existing in the rest of the universe.
VIII
If we subject the concept of organism to the three monistic conditions 
from the third section, the result is two somewhat disparate traits. First, 
organisms are real inasmuch as they exhibit certain forms of Bernardian, 
organizational unity and are not just façons de parler, verbal constructs. 
Second, part of their reality is to be projectors, to create intelligibility. In 
27 Starobinski 1956, 5, 11; Goldstein 1995, chap. 9. See also Barbaras 1999.
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that sense one might speak of a production of a vital artificiality (Wolfe 
2006). This is not a self-production in the sense of a strong vitalism, 
since it is an interplay or debate between internal needs and the environ-
ment, a dynamic equilibrium along the lines of Goldstein’s “fundamen-
tal biological law,” interrelating the organism’s self-actualization, and the 
stimuli and constraints received from the environment. Far from being 
an appeal to a mysterious substance or wonder tissue, this sense of a 
stable process of self-actualization is very close to what we would call to-
day a definition of organism in terms of its “causal closure,” a process of 
modulation whereby organism/environment interactions are modulated 
so as to maintain the conditions under which the agent can retain those 
very interactions.28
This reconstructed concept of organism does not repeat the exis-
tentialist leitmotive of subjectivity, possibility, and mortality (even if, of 
course, we allowed for a temporal dimension of organism which implies 
the “sting” of mortality29). After all, this fundamental biological law of 
interchange between an internal system and its own environment, being 
an inherently relational concept, is doubtless expressible in structural 
terms, so that organisms can only be paradigmatic individuals in and 
through such a debate or relation to a population, a group or an environ-
ment as a whole (Lewontin 1983/1985; Oyama 2000).
But an apposite danger awaits the biological theorist who has fully de-
substantialized her concept of organism, ridding it both of metaphysical 
flourishes like entelechies or élans vitaux and of category mistakes such as 
the assertion that the organism’s self-maintenance or unity or metabolic 
transformation are markers of the uniqueness of life. She may arrive at a 
rather dematerialized form of holism, in which the emphasis on relations 
causes one to lose sight of the biological. At first it sounds perfectly plau-
sible, if residually idealistic, to ask, like Paul Weiss: “Of what do we deprive 
a system when we dismember it and isolate its component parts, whether 
bodily or just in our mind? Plainly, of the interrelations that had existed 
among the parts while they were still united” (Weiss 1967, 802). This runs 
directly counter both to the old sense of mechanism as building a model in 
order to understand one’s object (cf. Thomson 1884), as a form of maker’s 
knowledge, and to more recent discussions of a kind of expanded, plural-
istic sense of mechanism (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). The real 
problem with this kind of approach – systemic, processual, relational, or, 
28 Goldstein 1995, 101, 103, 107, 293; Christensen and Hooker 1998; on organizational constraints 
see Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. 2000; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004; Mossio and Moreno 2010; 
Nuño de la Rosa 2010.
29 Thinking of Jonas’s comment that Whitehead’s philosophy of organism lacks any awareness of 
death: “Death, where is thy sting?” (Jonas 1966, 96).
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in other words, holistic – comes out more sharply in the formulation pro-
posed by Robert Rosen. The reductionist approach to living systems is to 
“throw away the organization and keep the underlying matter,” whereas 
what he calls, following Nicolas Rashevsky, the “relational approach” in 
biology, recommends that “when studying an organized material system,” 
one should “throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization” 
(Rosen 1991, 119). This sounds much like Varela and Maturana claiming 
that to understand machines we must disregard their materiality (Varela and 
Maturana 1972, 380).
This is really both anti-materialist and informational in an obsessive 
way (see Oyama 2000 and 2010 for some reflections on the non-dits of 
the informational perspectives in biology). Ironically, this is the sort of 
mistake the early Montpellier vitalists protested about with respect to 
anatomy, which had had so much success in the century prior to their 
writings (the 16th and 17th primarily), giving the investigator much infor-
mation about structure and nothing about the functioning of the living 
animal or human. Varela is quite blunt in his disregard for the material 
in which a system is realized. “We are thus saying that what defines a 
machine’s organization is relations, and hence that the organization of a 
machine has no connection with materiality, that is, with the properties 
of the components that define them as physical entities. In the organiza-
tion of a machine, materiality is implied but does not enter per se” (Va-
rela 1979, 9, cit. in Bechtel 2007, 294).30
Holism then suffers from a general weakness and a more specific 
problem. The more generic worry about holism and its relational em-
phasis was stated by Russell: “if all knowledge were knowledge of the 
universe as a whole, there would be no knowledge” (Russell, in Phillips 
1976, 11). We could call this the epistemological criticism of holism. A 
more ontological criticism would be to say that a mistake has been made 
about what wholes really are
. . . the Whole itself is a product, produced as nothing more than a part alongside 
other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes, though it has an effect on other 
parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths of communication between 
noncommunicating vessels, transverse unities between elements that retain all 
their differences within their own particular boundaries. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1973/1977, 42)
30 Of course the dematerialized view also has some serious philosophy on its side (compare Symons 
2010). “Many organisms totally exchange their substance several times over while they retain their 
individuality. Others undergo massive metamorphosis as well, changing their structure markedly. If 
organisms are paradigm individuals, then retention of neither substance nor structure is either neces-
sary or sufficient for continued identity in material bodies” (Hull 1992, 182).
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Granted, this seems to disregard the difference between different 
kinds of wholes, but it serves as a (mechanistic) reminder not to over-
emphasize the value of the concept “whole.” Brains, organisms, and 
persons are wholes, to be sure, but so are lots of other entities, and con-
versely, different kinds of mechanist, componential, reductionist analysis 
tell us a lot about all of these wholes. But the more specific problem as it 
appears in the above quotations from Rosen and Varela is the complete 
disregard – it is even recommended! – for the material facts about the 
living system being studied. The Bernardian approach to organization 
and its contemporary reconstruction by Bechtel seems an obvious re-
sponse, which precisely insists that one should not “throw away the mat-
ter” (contra Rosen). Notice that the second problem I have pointed to 
in holism/system theory exists in much the same form in functionalism. 
The disembodied tendency in multiple realizability arguments in which, 
as Putnam put it, “we could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn’t 
matter” (Putnam 1975, 291). Instead, we need to recognize that even the 
vitalist cannot ignore the biological matter in which a system is realized, 
the organizational features of a system.
That said, there are versions of the systems view which are consonant 
with the monistic criteria: “system thinking does not imply forgetting 
about the material mechanisms that are crucial to trigger off a biological 
type of phenomenon/behavior; rather, it means putting the emphasis on 
the interactive processes that make it up, that is, on the dynamic orga-
nization in which biomolecules (or, rather, their precursors) actually get 
integrated” (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 238). This helps bridge the 
gap between the systems perspective and the more materialistic and em-
bodied organizational perspective. The latter perspective seems to make 
the best of both worlds – mechanism and organism – without relying on 
a superannuated ontology, but also without opting for the non-commit-
tal comfort of pure instrumentalism. In addition, this perspective seems 
to capture something worthwhile about the history, as seen with Bichat 
and Bernard in Bechtel’s presentation, to which I have added the 18t- 
century medical vitalists. What is missing from this view is the projec-
tive aspect I reconstructed primarily from Goldstein’s rather suggestive 
discussion of organism.
Our inquiry into organism has produced two negatives and two 
positives. Concepts of organism to be rejected include ones which invoke 
theoretical entities such as organismic laws: this is a kind of category 
mistake and probably scientifically of little use, and also ones which rely 
on a kind of ineffable subjectivity to justify the uniqueness of organisms. 
We could add the problem of the forms of holism which dispense with 
materiality altogether but in some basic sense holism never intended to 
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be a specific theory of what living being is, even though the words holism and 
organicism have blurred into each other over time. Concepts of organism 
to be accepted, or integrated, include the Goldsteinian projective view 
(especially if it is mitigated with broadly Darwinian constraints), the non-
metaphysical, functional vitalism of the 18th century (in which organism 
or rather the animal economy and organized bodies are explanatory 
targets without any ontological baggage), and the Bernard-Bechtel 
organizational view.
If, contrary to what strong ontological vitalism might assert, there 
is nothing unique and special about organisms over and against the 
rest of nature and if, as Buffon thought, “the organic is the most or-
dinary product of nature,” what does exist is a certain approach to 
reality, the projection of heuristic fictions which produce intelligibil-
ity and promote viable courses of action. What remains to be done 
is to articulate this philosophical position with work on biological 
organization.
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